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COMMENTS 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act-
The Implications of the Trust-Fund Theory 
for the Church-State Questions Raised 
by Title I 
The issues raised by the granting of federal aid both to education 
in general and to non-public education in particular have caused 
considerable controversy in recent years.1 Although several federal 
statutes dealing with various aspects of both types of aid had been 
enacted previously,2 the early 1960's saw an increased desire on the 
part of Congress to enter this area with a comprehensive plan.3 
Finally, in 1965, the question of aid to education in general was 
resolved in favor of carrying the war on poverty to the elementary 
and secondary schools.4 Simultaneously, a so-called "church-state 
settlement" was reached whereby it was decided that some form of 
benefit should also be extended to non-public education. 5 Provisions 
reflecting both decisions were incorporated into and formed the basis 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA).6 
I. Bibliographies on the subjects of church-state relations and aid to religious 
education can be found in every issue of the JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE (published 
by the J. M. Dawson Studies in Church and State of Baylor University) and RELIGION 
AND THE PUBLIC ORDER (published by the Institute of Church and State of Villanova 
University School of Law). For other bibliographies see KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 131-34 (1964); MCGARRY &: WARD, EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM AND THE CA.SE 
FOR GOVERNMENT Am TO STUDENTS IN INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS 209-21 (1966); Education 
Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Constitutionality of Federal 
Aid to Education in its Various Aspects, S. Doc. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-ll0 
(1961). 
2. For a collection of these statutes see Education Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, op. cit. supra note I, at 37-48; Rafalko, The Federal Aid 
to Private School Controversy: A Look, 3 DUQ.UESNE U.L. REv. 211, 219 (1965). 
3. See Kelley 8: Lanoue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Edu-
cation Act, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 110, 112 (1966). For a background 
of the political development of the federal aid to education question, see BENDINER, 
OBSTACLE COURSE ON CAPITOL HILL (1964); MUNGER 8: FENNO, NATIONAL POLITICS AND 
FEDERAL Am TO EDUCATION (1962). See generally Education Subcomm. of Senate Comm. 
on Labor and Public Welfare, op. cit. supra note I. 
4. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act is intended to be one of the main 
tools of the poverty program. See S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. ll-4 (1965), for 
the President's message on the purpose of the Act; NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
THE EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1966), reproduced 
in H.R. REP. No. 1814 (pt. 2), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-23 (1966) [Page citations are 
hereinafter made to this reproduction]. 
5. Kelley &: Lanoue, supra note 3. The authors contend that the hearings on the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act produced, or were indicative of, a church-
state settlement among the various interest groups having a stake in federal aid to 
education. 
6. 79 Stat. 27 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-44, 331·36, 821-27, 841-48, 861-70, 
881-85 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 238, 240-44, 331a-32b, 821-23, 841-44, 
861-64, 867, 871-76 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter referred to as ESEA]. For the legislative 
history of the ESEA and its amendments, see S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Scss. 
[ 1184] 
Comments 1185 
To accomplish its primary goal of aiding all educationally deprived 
children with maximum flexibility,7 the ESEA includes five pro-
grams: auxiliary or special educational benefits in the form of ser-
vices or equipment;8 textbook grants and loans;9 special educational 
centers;10 grants to universities to advance educational research;11 
and grants to strengthen state departments of education.12 
The most significant of the five programs, as measured by the 
number of projects implemented and the amount of funds ex-
pended, is the special educational services program authorized by 
Title I.13 The administration of this program is highly decentralized, 
with responsibility distributed among the Office of Education of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the state educational 
agencies, and the local educational agencies. While federal control 
of any aspect of education is expressly prohibited,14 the Office of 
Education still performs three essential functions: developing guide-
lines for the administration of Title I; approving applications sub-
(1965) (ESEA of 1965); H.R. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (ESEA of 
1965); H.R. REP No. 1814, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (1966 amendments); Hearings on 
S. J70 Before the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (ESEA of 1965); Hearings on Aid to Elementary 
and Secondary Education Before the General Subcomm. on Education of the House 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (ESEA of 1965). 
7. E.S.E.A. § 201, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. 1965) (declaration of 
congressional purpose); H.R. REP. No. 1814 (pt. 2), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966); 
Note, Church-State-Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey-1964-66, 41 
NoTRE DAME LAw. 681, 715 (1966). The benefits of the ESEA are not, however, 
necessarily restricted to educationally deprived children. For example, the benefits of 
Titles II and V are accorded to all children. 
8. The auxiliary services and equipment program is dealt with in Title I of the 
ESEA, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 24la-44 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 
20 U.S.C.A. §§ 24la-44 (Supp. 1967). Title I amends Public Law 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100 
(1950), as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-44 (1964), which provides financial assistance for 
areas affected by federal activities. 
9. 79 Stat. 36 (1965), 20 U.S.C. §§ 821-27 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 821-23 (Supp. 1967) (Title II). 
10. 79 Stat. 39 (1965), 20 U.S.C. §§ 841-48 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 841-44 (Supp. 1967) (Title III). 
11. 79 Stat. 44 (1965), 20 U.S.C. §§ 331-32b (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 331a-32b (Supp. 1967) (Title IV). 
12. 79 Stat. 47 (1965), 20 U.S.C. §§ 861-70 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 861-64, 867 (Supp. 1967), is Title V of the ESEA. A sixth title was added to the 
ESEA in November 1966, providing funds for the education of handicapped children 
in public and non-public schools. 80 Stat. 1204 (1966), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 881-85 (Supp. 
1967). 
13. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at 11-12; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, A 
CHANCE FOR A CHANGE 52-56 (1965). 
14. E.S.E.A. § 604, 79 Stat. 57 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 884 (Supp. 1965): 
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any department, 
agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, super-
vision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration or 
personnel of any educational institution or school system, or over the selection of 
library resources, textbooks, or other printed or published instructional materials 
by any educational institution or school system. 
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mitted by state educational agencies for participation in Title I 
benefits; and determining the maximum amounts to be allocated to 
eligible local educational agencies.15 The state agency performs the 
pivotal administrative functions of submitting an application to the 
Office of Education, giving assurances that the state program will be 
implemented according to the tenor of the ESEA, and reviewing 
the project applications of the local educational boards, insisting 
upon their compliance with its prior assurances.16 The local educa-
tional agency, in turn, has the primary responsibility for deciding 
which geographical areas are in need of Title I funds and which 
types of project will best meet the needs of the educationally deprived 
children of that area.17 
The state agency will generally approve the local agency's project 
application if two major conditions are satisfied.18 First, the type and 
scope of the plan must be such that the plan can reasonably be ex-
pected to meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries.19 As to these 
determinations, the ESEA affords the local agency considerable 
leeway and discretion; not only are several widely varying project 
types suggested as available alternatives, 20 but local agencies are affir-
matively encouraged to improvise and create programs which are 
15. E.S.E.A. §§ 24lb-d, g-h, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241b (Supp. 1965), as 
amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241b (Supp. 1967); 79 Stat. 28 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C, 
§ 241c (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241c (Supp. 1967); 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 
repealed, 80 Stat. 1195, U.S.C.A. § 241d (Supp. 1967); 79 Stat. 32 (1965), as amended, 20 
U.S.C. § 241g (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241g (Supp. 1967); 79 Stat. 33 
(1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241h (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241h (Supp. 1967); see 
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, GUIDELINES: SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR 
EDUCATIONALLY DEPRIVED CHILDREN 1 (1965). 
16. E.S.E.A. §§ 205-06, 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241e (Supp. 1965), as amended, 
20 U.S.C.A. § 241e (Supp. 1967); 79 Stat. 31 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 241f (Supp. 
1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241f (Supp. 1967); see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1-2. 
17. E.S.E.A. § 24le, 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241e (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 
U.S.C.A. § 241e (Supp. 1967). Many states have drawn up guidelines to aid the local 
educational agencies in applying for Title I projects. See, e.g., HAWAII DEP'T OF EDUCA-
TION, TITLE I, P.L. 89-10 GUIDEUNES (1966); NEW MExlco DEP'T OF EDUCATION, GUIDE-
UNES: TITLE I, E.S.E.A. SERVICES (1966); PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF Puauc INSTRUCTION, 
PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT, TITLE 
1 (1966). 
18. In addition to the two enumerated conditions, several other requirements are 
iniposed by E.S.E.A. § 205, 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le (Supp. 1965), as amended, 
20 U.S.C.A. § 241e (Supp. 1967). The local agency must prove to the state agency's satis-
faction that control of the program will be in a public agency, that any construction 
project fulfills certain uniform requirements, that effective evaluation measures will be 
adopted, that the local agency will report annually to the state agency, that the pro-
gram will be carried on in cooperation with an existing community action program, 
and that educational research information derived from the program will be published. 
19. E.S.E.A. § 205(a)(l), 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(l) (Supp. 1965), as 
amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 24le(a)(l) (Supp. 1967). 
20. S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1965); see Sky, The Establishment 
Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. R.Ev. 1395, 
1449-52 (1966). 
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responsive to the peculiar needs of the educationally deprived chil-
dren of a particular project area.21 Although available statistics are 
far from complete,22 it appears that the bulk of Title I projects in-
volve some type of non-instructional service,23 such as remedial read-
ing or speech therapy.24 The similarity of the projects actually im-
plemented, especially when viewed in light of the discretion afforded 
local officials, seems to indicate a belief on the part of educators that 
the solution to the problems of educational deprivation lies in "com-
pensatory" educational services, which services offer the student spe-
cial instruction in a skill or subject, thereby enabling him to pro-
ceed at the same rate as his peers.25 
The second condition which a local board's project application 
must satisfy in order to obtain state approval is that deprived chil-
dren in non-public schools in the district must be included among 
the recipients of Title I benefits.26 This requirement raises two 
problems. First, since the ESEA apparently requires that the com-
pensatory or remedial instruction provided under Title I be given 
by public school personnel, 27 the local board must determine which 
of two available methods should be used to reach the non-public 
school pupils. Under the shared time method, the non-public pupil 
would leave his school either during or after school hours and go 
to the public school where he would receive the instruction.28 
On the other hand, under the shared services method, the pupil 
21. S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. IO (1965). 
22. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has recently given a grant 
to Boston University to make a complete study of the implementation of the ESEA 
in the various states. HEW itself is presently compiling statistics on the implementation 
of Title I, which will form the basis of Boston University's study. These statistics will 
reflect such items as the number of children involved, number of projects, type of 
projects, amounts spent. The only statistics which are presently available can be found 
in H.R. REP, No. 1814 (pt. 2), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24•27 (1966); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, op. dt. supra note 13, at 52-56. 
23. Non-instructional services are services designed to meet the special educational 
needs of educationally deprived children. See OP. IowA Arr'Y GEN., April 14, 1966, p. 6. 
24. A study of 500 selected Title I projects implemented in 1965 shows that 59% 
involved language arts or remedial reading. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE, op. cit, supra note 13, at 54; NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE EDUCATION 
OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15; Sky, supra note 20, at 1450. 
25. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, 
op. dt. supra note 4, at 14. For a definition of "compensatory education," see generally 
SMITH, KROUSE & ATKINSON, THE EDUCATOR'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 868 (1961). 
26. E.S.E.A. § 205(a)(2), 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le(a)(2) (Supp. 1965). 
27. Since it is doubtful that the salaries of non-public school teachers could consti• 
tutionally be paid from federal funds, public school teachers are the only ones who 
would qualify. See Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the 
First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 315 (1966). 
28. Shared time or dual enrollment is specifically authorized by E.S.E.A. § 205(a)(2), 
79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le(a)(2) (Supp. 1965). The regulations promulgated pur• 
suant to the ESEA also specify shared time as a possible means of carrying out a 
Title I project for the benefit of non-public schoolchildren. 45 C.F.R. § 116.19(c) (Supp. 
1966). 
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remains at the non-public school and is instructed by an in-coming 
teacher.29 Once the means of implementing the aid project have 
been selected, the second and more difficult problem must be re-
solved-whether either the shared time or shared services program 
is constitutional when it involves children attending church-related 
schools. One argument is that Title I programs violate the "establish-
ment of religion" or the "free exercise" clauses of the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.30 As it relates to shared 
time, this issue is treated subsequently in this issue31 and will not 
be dealt with directly in this Comment. A second argument is that 
since, with some exceptions,32 state constitutional provisions dealing 
with aid to non-public schools are more restrictive than those of the 
first amendment, 33 such programs may violate state constitutional 
provisions.34 It is therefore the purpose of this Comment to examine 
29. Shared services projects also appear to be specifically authorized by E.S.E.A. 
§ 205(a)(2), 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le(a)(2) (Supp. 1965). The regulations 
purport to limit the use of shared services to those projects that deal only with special 
educational services which the non-public school does not otherwise offer. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 116.19(d) (Supp. 1966). 
30. To date Title I has been challenged in three suits on first amendment grounds: 
Smith v. School Dist., Civil No. 3797 (C.P. Phila. County, Pa., filed Nov. 14, 1966); 
Flast v. Gardner, Civil No. 4102/1966 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 1, 1966); and Polier v. 
Board of Educ., Civil No. 19540/ 1966 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed Dec. 1, 1966). A suit 
contesting the validity of Title II under the first amendment is also pending. Protes-
tants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. United 
States, Civil No. 3303 (S.D. Ohio, motion to dismiss filed Aug. 16, 1966). In O'Hare v. 
:Board of Educ., Civil No. 27899 (E.D. Mich., filed Jan. 17, 1966), a suit challenging 
Michigan's Auxiliary Services Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 340.622 (Supp. 1966), the court 
granted a motion to abstain. The court will retain jurisdiction of the case, holding the 
first amendment challenge in abeyance until the state courts have interpreted the act 
under state law. :Because of the similarity between the provisions of the Michigan Act 
and Title I, it has been suggested that a determination of the constitutionality of the 
former will bear heavily on the latter. See Church and State, March 1966, p. 6. 
For a discussion of the constitutional validity of the ESEA, see Sky, supra note 
20, at 1441-62; Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the 
First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302 (1965). See generally Carey, The Child Benefits Sys-
tem in Operation-Federal Style, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 185 (1966); Taylor, Federal Aid for 
Children and Teachers in All Schools, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 193 (1966). The New Jersey 
Attorney General has expressed the opinion that the ESEA is valid under the first 
amendment. OP. N.J. Arr'y GEN. No. 4 (1965). 
31. See Note, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1967). 
32. E.g., ORE. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3. These provisions have been held to be identical 
to the provisions of the United States Constitution. City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 
Ore. 508, 149 P.2d 972, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 770 (1944). Iowa's Constitution reads simi-
larly to the Federal Constitution. IowA CONST. art. I, § 3. 
33. See Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the First 
Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 306 (1966). For a brief study of some of the factors which 
led to the restrictive attitude of the states, see McLAUGHLIN, A HISTORY OF STATE LEGIS• 
LATION AFFECTING PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1870-1945 (1946). See generally State ex rel. Weiss v. District Ed., 76 Wis. 177, 197-98, 
44 N.W. 967, 974-75 (1890). 
34. The legislative history of the ESEA indicates that Congress was concerned 
with the problem of state law and its effect on the implementation of the Act. See 
Hearings on S. 370 Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-477 (1965). The bulk of this material 
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the applicability of state law to Title I programs and to consider the 
possible effects which a finding of invalidity may entail. 
I. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The problem of determining the relevance of state substantive 
law to the implementation of Title I is a difficult one because of the 
lack of relevant precedent. Many, if not the majority of, state 
agencies seem to have ignored the problem and are currently pro-
ceeding in general conformity with the federal guidelines.35 Never-
theless, it should be noted that this lack of guidance may be one of 
the causes of the apparent confusion existing at the state level with 
respect to the amount of participation of non-public schoolchildren 
which is required in order to conform with the provisions of Title I. 
Moreover, this confusion was recognized as one of the principal 
reasons for the setbacks during the first year of Title I's operation.36 
However, many state departments of education have requested their 
attorneys general to consider the relevance of their state law to the 
establishment of a Title I program. Since the authorization for these 
programs is found in a federal statute, it might appear at first blush 
that the effect, if any, of state law on these programs would be 
rendered nugatory by operation of the supremacy clause of the 
federal constitution.37 However, if some aspect of the Title I pro-
gram is not completely controlled by the federal law and is a proper 
object of state concern, state law would be applicable despite the 
supremacy clause. Two such aspects of the programs have been 
suggested: (I) the funds themselves which have been transmitted 
by the Office of Education to the state agency; and (2) the state 
officials who are involved in the administration of the particular 
program. 
A. Title I Funds as an Object of State Constitutional 
Concern: The Trust-Fund Theory 
One of the problems which received considerable attention dur-
ing the hearings on the ESEA was the allocation of control over 
is a study of various state constitutional provisions relevant to the church-state issue. 
There are also several books which deal with the effect of state constitutional law on 
religious freedom and aid to sectarian institutions. See generally ANTIEAU, CARROLL & 
Burum, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS (1964); McLAUGHLIN, op. dt. supra note 33. 
35. A survey of all 50 state departments of education showed that, of the 43 that 
responded, only thirteen had solicited opinions on the legality of implementing the 
ESEA under state law-Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, West Virginia and "Wisconsin. 
36. One setback occasioned by this confusion was the inadequate degree of partici-
pation by non-public schoolchildren in Title I projects. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUN-
CIL ON THE EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 19, 22. 
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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Title I programs among federal, state, and private agencies,38 
although it is unlikely that private agencies were ever seriously 
considered as a proper repository of significant power.30 The out-
come of the debates was a series of provisions, the most important of 
which is section 203(a), stating that a local project will be approved 
only if 
the local educational agency has provided satisfactory assurance that 
the control of funds provided under this subchapter, and title to 
property derived therefrom, shall be in a public agency for the uses 
and purposes provided in this subchapter; and that a public agency 
will administer such funds and property.40 
The few cases which have dealt with the status of federal grants 
to states in aid of education have generally held that a trust arises 
which forces the state to comply with the stated purposes of the 
grant in distributing the assets.41 In addition, several administrative 
rulings, particularly those of the Comptroller-General of the United 
States, suggest that a state as the grantee of federal funds must adhere 
to the conditions and purposes specified in the grant.42 Furthermore, 
38. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 5727-72 (1965). 
39. However, some states have included non-public school authorities in planning 
Title I projects for the district. See Letter From Henry H. Parker, Director of the Kansas 
Department of Public Instruction, to the Michigan Law Review, Nov. 9, 1966; Letter 
From Ralph G. Hay, Administrative Coordinator of the Montana Department of 
Public Instruction, to the Michigan Law Review, Sept. 30, 1966; Letter From Leon R. 
Graham, Assistant Commissioner for Administration of the Texas Education Agency, 
to the Michigan Law Review, Sept. 23, 1966. 
40. E.S.E.A. § 205(a)(3), 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le(a)(3) (Supp. 1965). In 
addition, the following sections also bear on the control question: § 206, 79 Stat. 31 
(1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 24lf (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 24lf (Supp. 
1967) (providing review by the Office of Education of assurances submitted by state 
agencies); § 207, 79 Stat. 32 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 241g (Supp. 1965), as 
amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241g (Supp. 1967) (regulating disposition of funds by the state 
agency); § 210, 79 Stat. 33 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24lj (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 24lj (Supp. 1967) (listing sanctions which can be imposed for non-compliance with 
assurances): § 604, 79 Stat. 57 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 884 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 
U.S.C.A. § 884 (Supp. 1967) (prohibiting federal control of any aspect of education). 
41. See, e.g., Montana State Federation of Labor v. School Dist., 7 F. Supp. 82 (D. 
Mont. 1934) (federal grant to local school district under N.R.A. must be used to pro-
mote the purposes of the statute); State ex rel. :Black v. :Board of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 
196 Pac. 201 (1921) (proceeds of land grants from federal government are trust funds 
and, therefore, not subject to state constitutional provision that money paid from state 
treasury first be appropriated by state legislature); Indiana v. Springfield Twp., 6 Ind. 
83 (1854) (congressional land grant constitutes a trust and must be used for the purposes 
specified in the grant, citing several supporting cases); State ex rel. Spencer Lens Co. v. 
Searle, 77 Neb. 155, 109 N.W. 770 (1906) (same); Ross v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyoming, 
31 Wyo. 464, 228 Pac. 642 (1924) (federal grant for university purpose said to be a trust 
fund, the court stating: "Upon the state's acceptance of the grant, it was placed in the 
position of a trustee; it holds the lands for the purposes expressed in the grant, and 
no other, and is under at least a moral obligation to conform to the terms and condi-
tions contained in the granting act." Id. at 489-90, 228 Pac. at 651). But see State v. 
Clausen, 160 Wash. 618, 295 Pac. 751 (1931) (federal funds subject to state constitutional 
provision requiring legislative appropriation of state funds). 
42. In a series of opinions, the Comptroller-General has consistently stated that 
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although the legislative history is somewhat unclear,43 several provi-
sions of the ESEA suggest that the drafters intended to create a 
trust, with the funds constituting the "res" and the state agency as 
the trustee. First, section 203(a) quoted above is phrased in classic 
trust terms-the legal title and administrative control is in the state 
"for the uses and purposes" which are subsequently described in the 
remainder of the section. Second, as in the creation of a trust, the 
Office of Education, pursuant to Title I, requires assurances from the 
state agency that its programs will be constructed and implemented 
so as to effectuate the specified purposes of section 205.44 Finally, 
Title I contemplates certain procedures which closely resemble a 
standard trust administration scheme. For example, the applicant 
state must assure the Office of Education "that such fiscal control and 
fund accounting procedures will be adopted as may be necessary to 
assure the proper disbursement of, and accounting for, Federal funds 
paid to the State ... .''45 The actual method of accounting suggested 
in the federal guidelines closely resembles the type of accounting 
used in most trusts. 46 In addition, the Office of Education retains 
some control over the implemented projects by means of an extensive 
federal grant-in-aid payments made to the state cease to be federal and become state 
funds. See, e.g., 25 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 868 (1946) (funds granted for agricultural college 
extension work); 16 DE<:.5, COMP. GEN. 948 (1937) (social security funds); 14 DEcs. CoMP. 
GEN. 916 (1935) (funds granted to state under authority of Emergency Relief Appropria-
tion Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115). Nevertheless, as a corollary, it also seems settled that if 
a particular grant is made upon some condition, the state law which would otherwise 
be applicable must give way to the paramount federal interest. In addition to the above 
decisions, see 2 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 684 (1923) (federal funds paid to a state under the 
Vocational Education Act are held in custody by the state for the specific purposes 
provided for by the act). The General Accounting Office has not as yet rendered an 
opinion on the ESEA. See Letter From J. H. Coffey, Assistant General Counsel of the 
G.A.O., to the Michigan Law Review, Jan. 17, 1967. See generally HAMILTON, SELECTED 
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN PROVIDING FEDERAL AID FOR EDUCATION 10-11 (1938), a study prepared 
for the Advisory Committee on Education appointed by President Roosevelt in 1936 
for the purpose of studying the subject of federal relationships with state and local 
government. 
43. Compare S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1965) (suggesting a number 
of ESEA requirements which appear to impose a trust), with Ill CONG. REc. 7309 
(1965) (remarks of Senator Morse indicating that Title I funds would be commingled 
with state funds and would therefore apparently lose their trust impression). See also 
45 C.F.R. § 116.20 (Supp. 1966). 
44. E.S.E.A. § 205, 79 Stat, 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 
U.S.C.A. § 24le (Supp. 1967). 
45. E.S.E.A. § 206(a)(2), 79 Stat. 31 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 24lf(a)(2) (Supp. 
1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 24lf (Supp. 1967). 
46. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 
5-12, for the requirement of fiscal administration. The accounting system to be used 
for Title I funds has been considered a significant element in determining whether 
federal funds are impressed with a trust. OP. IowA ATT'Y GEN., April 14, 1966 (the obli-
gation method of accounting which the state must use indicates the trust impression of 
Title I funds). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FINAN-
CIAL MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL-STATE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 2, 3, 5 (1962), for the require-
ment of separate identification funds for each separate federal education program. 
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evaluation program, which includes a periodic audit analogous to a 
fiduciary accounting.47 
The importance of the trust-fund theory lies in its effect on the 
applicability of state law to the "res" of the trust. If the ESEA has 
created a true trust, it would appear that state law could not be in-
voked as a criterion by which to measure the legality of Title I 
expenditures; since the funds are granted only upon receipt of an 
assurance that they will be spent in accordance with the purposes of 
the federal statute, only federal law is applicable.48 Therefore, as-
suming that a program envisioned by the drafters of the ESEA 
does not violate the federal constitution, a state constitutional provi-
sion could not, pursuant to the trust-fund theory, be used to defeat 
that program. It must, however, be noted that the trust-fund theory 
can be invoked to render state law irrelevant only with respect to 
the possible uses of the corpus of the trust and, as will be discussed 
below, the theory is not applicable with respect to the actions of state 
officials.49 
Several states have seized upon the trust-fund theory in order to 
insure that local educational agencies will include parochial and 
other non-public schoolchildren among the recipients of the benefits 
of Title I projects, pursuant to section 205(a)(2). These states can be 
divided into two groups on the basis of their existing framework of 
laws. The first group comprises those states which have passed some 
type of statute enabling the state educational agency to apply for, 
receive, and distribute Title I funds according to the guidelines 
established by the ESEA and its regulations. 50 Since the enabling 
47. E.S.E.A. § 206, 79 Stat. 31 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 24lf(a)(2) (Supp. 1965), 
as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 24lf (Supp. 1967), subjects the state's Title I program to an 
evaluation by the Office of Education. If tbe Commissioner determines that the assur-
ances given pursuant to § 205, 79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le (Supp. 1965), as 
amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 24le (Supp. 1967), are not being met, he may withhold further 
payment of funds. E.S.E.A. § 210, 79 Stat. 33 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 24lj (Supp. 1967). If 
the state agency wishes to contest the Commissioner's determination, it may bring a 
suit in the court of appeals for a review of his action. E.S.E.A. § 211, 79 Stat. 33 (1965), 
20 U.S.C. § 241k (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241k (Supp. 1967). 
48. HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 42, at 1-2. See also State ex rel. Black v. Board of 
Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 (1921). See generally Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 
50 (1908), which involved the constitutionality under the first amendment of an Ameri-
can Indian appropriation act forbidding contracts for the education of Indians in sec-
tarian schools. The Court held that the first amendment and the statute applied only 
to money collected by taxation of the general public and not to tribal and trust funds 
belonging to the Indians. The case was also partially based on the proposition that to 
deny the possibility of sectarian education to Indian children would violate their right 
of free exercise under the first amendment. Id. at 81-82. 
49. See text accompanying notes 60-78 infra. 
50. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 156.100 (Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-!l5(g) 
(Supp. 1965); ORE. REv. STAT. § 326.051(2)(b) (1965); w. VA. CODE § 18-10-8 (1966). The 
Ohio enabling act, which has been regarded as a model in its liberality, provides: 
The state board of education or any other board of education may provide for 
any resident of a district any educational service for which funds are made avail-
able to such boards of education by the United States under the authority of public 
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act in such states explicitly permits that which the ESEA requires, 
the only important question which remains is one of state constitu-
tional law: Can the enabling act be validly implemented to the 
extent that it deals with the funds themselves? If, as has been as-
serted, Title I allocations are impressed with a federal trust, the 
supremacy clause operates to render state law irrelevant and the 
enabling statute, insofar as it deals with the purposes for which the 
funds are expended, merely restates what would be the law in its 
absence. Thus, although a state court could purport to declare the 
ESEA violative of the state's constitutional provisions, such a 
declaration could not be a proper basis for prohibiting the state 
officials from utilizing the funds in accordance with the requirements 
of the ESEA. 
The second group of states in which the attorneys general have 
invoked the trust-fund theory to immunize Title I funds from state 
constitutional provisions prohibiting the use of state funds for a 
religious institution consists of states which do not have specific 
enabling acts.51 The opinions of these attorneys general reason that 
since such funds are impressed with a trust, they must be used in 
strict accordance with the federal guidelines, state constitutional 
restrictions notwithstanding. 52 Such a position appears to be an 
implicit recognition that an enabling statute is superfluous insofar 
as it purports to authorize the disbursement of funds in a manner 
consistent with the policy evidenced by the federal law. Thus, the 
trust-fund theory together with or absent an enabling act renders 
state substantive law irrelevant in determining the permissible uses 
of Title I funds. 
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the trust-fund concept, 
several states have taken the position that state constitutional provi-
sions prohibiting aid to religious institutions are relevant in deter-
mining the purposes for which Title I funds can be spent. This view 
is based upon the idea that once grants have been transmitted from 
the Office of Education they become state funds and are thus within 
the purview of the state constitution.53 With one exception,54 the 
law, whether such funds come directly or indirectly from the United States or any 
agency or department thereof or through the state of Ohio or any agency, depart-
ment or political subdivision thereof. 
Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1966). 
51. See, e.g., OP. GA. An'Y GEN., July 7, 1965; OP. IowA An'y GEN., April 14, 1966; 
OP. NEv. krr'Y GEN., Nov. 5, 1965; OP. N.Y. An'y GEN., July 15, 1965; OP. P.R. An'Y 
GEN., May 20, 1966. 
52. See, e.g., OP. IowA An'y GEN., April 14, 1966, p. 7. 
53. See, e.g., OP. OKLA. ATI''Y GEN. No. 65-302, Sept. 16, 1965, p. 8: 
We see no essential difference in whether or not federal grant funds only are used 
in approved programs or federal grant funds and local school district funds are 
used; both are public money or property within the prohibition contained in 
Article II, Section 5, Okla. Constitution. 
See also OP. S.D. An'y GEN., March 10, 1966. 
54. The opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General does not mention any state 
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attorney general opinions espousing this conclusion rely upon state 
statutes which require funds received from the federal government 
for educational purposes to be placed in the state treasury or in a 
school fund. 55 Since these funds are thus commingled with state 
funds, it can be argued that they too become state funds subject to 
applicable state constitutional restrictions.56 Admittedly, it has been 
suggested that the segregation of funds is crucial to the applicability 
of the trust-fund theory.57 However, although there was some indica-
tion that ESEA funds would be commingled with state funds, 58 it 
is doubtful that such commingling occurs in actual practice.cm Fur-
thermore, even if Title I funds are commingled, it does not neces-
sarily follow that they lose the trust which was impressed upon them 
by virtue of their being federal grants upon conditions. Therefore, 
once again invoking the supremacy clause, such funds would be 
controlled by the paramount federal interest, and state law would 
necessarily be viewed as irrelevant. 
B. Administrative Officials as a Possible Object of 
State Constitutional Concern 
Little consideration has been given in the various attorney 
general opinions to the possible relevance of state law to the activities 
statutes which require federal funds to be placed in the state treasury. OP. OKLA. ATT'Y 
GEN. No. 65-302, Sept. 16, 1965, p. 8. 
55. See OP. NEB. ATT'Y GEN. No. 123, Oct. 27, 1965, p. 2; OP. Wis. ATT'Y GEN., July 
19, 1966, p. 4, citing WIS. STAT. § 20.550(68) (1966), which states: 
Any and all funds which may be paid to this state under the authority of s. 
16.54 shall, upon receipt, be paid into the state treasury, and the same shall be 
and are appropriated to the state board, commission or department designated by 
the governor to administer the same. Expenditures of such funds shall be made 
in the same manner and subject to the laws, rules and regnlations governing pay-
ments made by the state treasury, and further such expenditures shall be made 
in accord with federal rules and regulations. 
This statute seems to be internally inconsistent since it states that, although federal 
funds must be spent in accordance with state rules, they must also be expended in 
accordance with federal rules. It is possible, however, that due to the omission of the 
word "law" in the latter part of the sentence, the statute merely requires expenditures 
according to federal procedures. 
56. See, e.g., OP. Wis. ATT'Y GEN., July 19, 1966, p. 10. 
57. See OP. KY. ATT'Y GEN. No. 65-865, Dec. 17, 1965, p. 5; OP. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN., July 
15, 1965. 
58. Ill CoNG. REc. 7309 (1965) (remarks of Mr. Morse). 
59. The process by which Title I funds reach the creditors of the local school dis-
trict is described in OP. ORE. ATT'Y GEN. No. 6162, July 29, 1966, pp. 9-10. It appears 
that after the Office of Education makes an allotment to a state, a "letter of credit" is 
issued to the state educational agency. This letter allows a maximum amount to be 
drawn from the regional federal reserve bank and sent to the bank in which general 
state money is deposited, and there it is placed in a special federal funds account in the 
name of the State Treasurer. The Treasurer notifies the state educational agency of 
the availability of the funds, and the agency in turn issues vouchers to the Secretary 
of State authorizing payment of the local agency's creditors. See generally U.S. DEP'T 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, GuIDEUNES: SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR EDUCATIONALLY 
DEPRIVED CHILDREN 5-8 (1966). 
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of the state officials who administer Title I programs. In the few 
opinions in which the issue has been raised, it has been disposed of 
by characterizing such officials as mere instrumentalities or custo-
dians of the federal funds, thereby bringing them within the scope 
of the trust-fund theory. It is thus argued that, in the exercise of 
their fiduciary duty, they are governed by the same federal law which 
controls the disposition of the Title I funds, and since the federal 
law is supreme, state constitutional restrictions would be irrelevant.60 
However, as noted above, 61 although federal funds would appear to 
be justifiably excluded from the reach of state law, such an approach 
cannot logically be utilized with respect to persons who are at all 
times state officials. Unfortunately, the proponents of the custodian 
theory fail to specify their reasons for excluding these officials from 
the application of state law. At the very least, the state has an 
economic interest in the man-hours expended by the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction and his staff in constructing and implementing 
the Title I program. Moreover, the analysis which was employed to 
refute the idea that the federal funds became state funds merely 
because they have been transmitted to the state62 would, in this 
instance, support the conclusion that state officials retain their 
identity as state officials regardless of their involvement in the 
administration of a federal program. Thus, although the state 
officials may be labeled custodians or conduits, they would still 
appear to be subject to the restrictions of the state constitution. 
The Oregon Attorney General, admitting that participation in 
Title I programs seems to violate the spirit of the Oregon Constitu-
tion, nonetheless has concluded that, absent specific state constitu-
tional restrictions, the presumed validity of the state enabling statute 
authorizing administration of Title I programs by state personnel 
must be given controlling weight.63 In effect, therefore, his position 
is that a state statute which permits certain conduct by state ad-
ministrators can by itself render the state constitution inoperative 
as to the conduct of such officials. The difficulty with this view, how-
ever, is that it begs the question of whether the enabling act itself is 
unconstitutional. The enabling act is presumed constitutional be-
cause, absent specific constitutional restrictions on the conduct au-
thorized by the act, the act will prevail. However, under such an 
interpretation, an enabling statute of this type could never be 
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, ultimate policy would be 
governed, not by the state constitution, but rather by the invulner-
able enabling act. 
60. See, e.g., OP. IOWA Arr'y GEN., April 14, 1966, p. 7. 
61. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra. 
62. Ibid. 
63. See OP. ORE. Arr'y GEN. No. 6162, July 29, 1966, p. 16. 
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A fact which partially answers the idea that state substantive law 
might be applicable to the administration of Title I programs and 
with which the Oregon Attorney General could have avoided the 
circularity of his approach is that the ESEA authorizes federal 
financing of the administrative expenses incurred in implementing 
the state plan.64 It could be argued that, by virtue of this federal 
remuneration, the state personnel involved in administering the 
programs become federal officials pro tanto.65 Therefore, either 
because the state's interest in the conduct of these officials is lacking 
or because the supremacy clause relegates state law to a subservient 
position, the state cannot presume to regulate any aspect of a Title I 
program. This analysis would seem to be especially appropriate in 
states whose constitutional provisions with respect to the establish-
ment of religion are phrased in terms of prohibiting the withdrawal 
of public funds for the support of religious institutions.66 In these 
states, it might be argued that the state's only concern is with the 
expenditure of state monies and since, as noted above, money is not 
being drawn from its treasury, this limited state constitutional pro-
vision is not a relevant consideration. On the other hand, in those 
states whose constitutional prohibitions are based not on the with-
drawal of funds but rather, for example, on the use of any public 
money,67 the federal supremacy clause would once again be appro-
priate support for the conclusion that federal law controls. 
It is submitted, however, that there are at least two areas in which 
state officials are still subject to or controlled by state substantive 
law. The first is administrative conduct that in no way impinges 
upon the purposes for which Title I funds are given to the state. For 
example, a state penal statute prohibiting members of local boards 
of education from acquiring a pecuniary benefit as a result of con-
tracts with the educational agency is a proper point of reference 
64. The ESEA authorizes payment of administrative expenses to the extent of 
1% of the total amount of the basic grant. E.S.E.A. § 207(b), 79 Stat. 32 (1965), as 
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 24lg(b) (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241g (Supp. 1967). 
65. The pro tanto issue was apparently considered sufficiently important to prompt 
the Kentucky Department of Public Instruction to inquire whether teachers paid by 
Title I funds would be subject to state certification requirements and eligible for state 
tenure and pension benefits. OP. KY. An'y GEN. No. 66-139, March 4, 1966, answered 
both questions in the affirmative. 
66. See OP. GA. An'y GEN., July 7, 1965, p. 2. The Georgia Constitution is phrased 
in such terms. GA. CONST. art. I, § I, 11 XIV. Consequently, the Georgia Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that Title II could be implemented because administrative as well as opera-
tional expenses would be defrayed from federal funds. Cf. OP. Aruz. An'y GEN., Oct. 
4, 1965; OP. N.Y. An'Y GEN., July 15, 1965. 
Moreover, Georgia appears to be the only state which, by constitutional amendment, 
has made possible the use of state matching funds in federally financed programs. See 
GA. CONST. art. VII, § I, 11 II(7), which gives the state government and its departments 
and agencies authority to disburse state funds to match federal funds for certain speci• 
fied scholarships "and for use in other Federal education programs." 
67. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX,§ 7; N.Y. CONST. art. XI,§ 3. 
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for examining the behavior of state personnel distributing ESEA 
funds. 68 Since there is no federal law in this area, the supremacy 
clause is inapplicable. Moreover, since the expressed federal purpose 
for which the trust funds were granted is neither advanced nor im-
peded by violations of such statutes, it would seemingly be appro-
priate to adhere to the state law and thereby further the legitimate 
state interest of regulating the affairs of its employees. However, if 
the federal government were to enact legislation with respect to this 
question, clearly federal law would control to the exclusion of state 
regulation.69 
Second, state substantive law also controls the conduct of state 
officials qua state officials. Admittedly, certain persons, such as 
teachers, may become federal employees pro tanto because they 
receive payments from Title I funds, but some officials who are 
intimately involved in the implementing of Title I programs, such 
as the Superintendent and his staff, perform at least several functions 
in their capacity as state representatives-namely, the applying for 
and receiving of Title I funds and the submission of the requisite 
assurances to the Office of Education.70 Since theoretically the federal 
government does not have an interest in whether a state decides to 
accept a grant-in-aid, the policy determination to apply for such 
funds is made by the Superintendent in his capacity as spokesman 
for the state, and consequently his conduct with respect to these 
matters would be regulated by state law. 
The opinion of the South Dakota Attorney General is one of the 
few that specifically considers the effect of the state constitution on 
the conduct of public officials.71 The attorney general concluded that 
the implementation of shared services programs would violate a 
constitutional provision which forbids "the state or any county or 
municipality within the state [to] accept any grant ... to be used 
for sectarian purposes .... "72 Consequently, he advised that Title I 
programs could be established as long as shared services projects 
were excluded from the proposed programs. Implicit in his opinion is 
a rejection of the trust-fund theory, for had the theory been accepted, 
he would not have been able to advise state officials to refrain from 
implementing shared services projects since to so advise would be 
68. OP. w. VA. An'Y GEN., July 22, 1966. 
69. The Iowa Attorney General has expressed the opinion that a misappropriation 
of Title I funds would be a federal crime. See OP. IowA An'y GEN., April 14, 1966, p. 
7, basing his opinion on United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
70. See E.S.E.A. § 206, 79 Stat. 31 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 24lf (Supp. 1965), 
as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 24lf (Supp. 1967). 
71. OP. S.D. An'y GEN., March 10, 1966; cf. OP. KY. An'y GEN. No. 65-865, Dec. 17, 
1965, p. 8, for what appears to be a discussion of the possible effect of state law on the 
conduct of state educational officials. 
72. OP. S.D. An'y GEN., March 10, 1966, p. 6. The relevant provision is found in 
S.D. CONST. art. vm, § 16. 
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to ·encourage their violating the conditions of the trust. Moreover, if 
the trust-fund theory were accepted, it would have been necessary to 
face the crucial question of whether the ~onstitution would be 
violated by the acceptance of such conditioned funds, and the only 
result possible, given the explicit language of the constitution, would 
be the elimination of Title I programs in South Dakota for both 
public and non-public schoolchildren. 
It is submitted that in deciding whether a state should under-
take a Title I program, it would be proper to determine initially 
whether the various types of projects authorized by the federal act, 
including shared time and shared services, can constitutionally be 
implemented by the state and its officials. Obviously, unless this 
question can be answered in the affirmative, the requisite assurances 
cannot be given to the Office of Education. Apart from South Dakota 
and Nebraska, which have specific restrictions on the acceptance of 
such grants, 73 there are apparently four general types of constitutional 
provisions which could be interpreted as being relevant to the con-
duct of state administrative officials. First, the most common con-
stitutional provision forbids the withdrawal of money from the state 
treasury in aid of sectarian institutions.74 It might be argued that 
the payment of the salary or expenses of any person involved in 
administering the Title I program constitutes such a withdrawal and 
is, therefore, unconstitutional. Second, several constitutions prohibit 
the use of any public money whatever for sectarian purposes.75 Al-
though the trust-fund theory would render such a provision irrele-
vant as to the purposes for which the money is spent, it might be 
argued that Title I funds are "public money whatever," and that 
therefore the constitution prohibits the act of using such money by 
state officials for sectarian purposes. Third, absent an express or 
implied limitation on the conduct of state personnel, some state con-
stitutions could nonetheless be interpreted as containing a "policy" 
restricting official conduct with respect to church-state matters.76 
Finally, there are a few states with provisions sui generis, such as 
Maryland77 and South Carolina,78 which may be relevant to the 
actions of state officials. 
73. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; S.D. CoNST. art. VIII, § 16. 
74. See, e.g., ALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, § l; GA. CONST. art. I, § l; MICH. CONST. art. 
I,§ 4; TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
75. See, e.g., CoLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; N.Y. CoNST. art. XI, § 3. 
76. The Oregon Attorney General expressed the opinion that certain aspects of the 
ESEA might violate the "policy" of the Oregon Constitution. OP. ORE, An:'y GEN. No. 
6162, July 29, 1966, pp. 11, 16. See also OP. NEB. An:'y G:e:N, No. 123, Oct. 27, 1965, p. 3. 
77. MD, CONST. art. 38, states in part "That every gift •.• to, or for the support, 
use or benefit of, or in trust for • . • any Religious Sect, Order or Denomination • • • 
without the prior or subsequent sanction of the Legislature, shall be void • • • ." 
78. S.C. CoNST. art. XI, § 9: 
· fA]ny public money, from whatever source derived, shall not, by gift, donation, 
ioan, contract, appropriation, or otherwise, be used, directly or indirectly, in aid 
or maintenance of any • • • institution • • • of whatever kind, which is wholly or 
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II. ACCEPTANCE OF THE TRUST-FUND THEORY 
A. Effect on the Availability of Remedies 
1199 
The initial hurdle for a federal taxpayer challenging the con-
stitutionality of the ESEA is one of standing. Although the 
Frothingham79 doctrine probably eliminates the possibility of bring-
ing such a suit in a federal court under the federal constitution, 
there apparently is not a similar restriction when the claim is 
brought in a state court and is based upon state law.80 Thus, the 
in part under the direction or control of any church or of any religious or sectarian 
denomination, society or organization. 
79. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923): 
But the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is 
very different [from that existing between a stockholder and a corporation]. His 
interest in the moneys of the Treasury-partly realized from taxation and partly 
from other sources-is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute 
and indeterminable; and the effect on future taxation, of payment out of the funds, 
so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the 
preventive powers of a court of equity •.•. 
• • . ·we have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the 
ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when 
the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justi-
ciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. •.• The party who invokes the power 
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its en-
forcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with 
people generally. 
On the standing question under the Federal Constitution, see Drinan, Standing To Sue 
in Establishment Cases, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PuBuc ORDER 161 (1966); Brown, Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School Prayer Cases, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 15-33; Pfeffer, 
Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Standing To Bring Suit, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 35 
(1963); Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25 (1962). 
There was an unsuccessful attempt in the 89th Congress to enact a standing provi-
sion authorizing taxpayers suits. See S. 2097, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on 
S. 2097 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress 
and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1442-43 (1966). Title I 
does, however, confer standing on the state agency to challenge a wrongful refusal by 
the Office of Education to give funds to the aggrieved agency, E.S.E.A. § 211, 79 Stat. 
33 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241k (Supp. 1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241k (Supp. 1967). 
Moreover, if a local educational agency were to refuse to provide for non-public school-
children, it is likely that an aggrieved child would have standing to challenge such re-
fusal on the basis of the equal protection clause. Cf. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 
U.S. 668 (1963). 
80. The three factors relevant to the standing issue-the action questioned, the 
constitution interpreted and the forum-lend themselves to the following eight per-
mutations: 
Action Questioned 
(I) Federal (Title I) 
(2) Federal " 
(3) Federal 
(4) Federal 
(5) State (State officials) 
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state court can legitimately be asked to determine the type of relief 
which should be granted when an individual establishes that he has 
been aggrieved by a violation of the state constitution. If the trust-
Assuming a suit by a taxpayer only as such, and not, for example, as a person alleg-
ing a violation of a free exercise guarantee or as a parent of a schoolchild, the following 
would appear to be the probable disposition of each situation on the standing issue: 
(1) If this suit were originally brought in a federal court, it would seem to be a 
classic case for the application of the Frothingham doctrine, subject to any erosion of 
the no-standing principle resulting from the later cases. See note 79 supra. The difficult 
question arises where this suit was initiated as permutation (2) and later comes to the 
Supreme Court on certiorari. The Court would appear to have three alternatives. First, 
it could deny certiorari on the ground that plaintiff's lack of standing precludes a 
federal court from taking cognizance of the action. Second, the Court might grant cer-
tiorari and dismiss the complaint because of lack of standing. Third, certiorari could 
be granted and the merits considered on the ground that the state court's determination 
of standing is binding. Cf. Doremus v. :Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (emphasis 
added): 
We do not undertake to say that a state court may not render an opinion on a 
federal constitutional question even under such circumstances that it can be re-
garded only as advisory. But, because our own jurisdiction is cast in terms of "case 
or controversy," we cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the basis for con-
clusive disposition of an issue of federal law without review, any procedure which 
does not constitute such. 
In Doremus, the appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey was dismissed. See also 
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH, L. REv. 1031, 1057 
(1963). As a hedge against application of Frothingham to Flast v. Gardner, Civil No. 
4102/1966 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 1, 1966), a suit of the permutation (1) variety, the Amer-
ican Jewish Congress, through its special counsel, Mr. Leo Pfeffer, instituted a permu-
tation (2) suit, Polier v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 19540/1966 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, 
filed Dec. I, 1966). See American Jewish Cong., News Release, Dec. 1, 1966. 
(2) It is unclear what the state court would do with the standing issue in this suit. 
If Frothingham is deemed controlling, it would appear that the state court would be 
free to determine the issue as a matter of state law. The extract from Frothingham set 
out in note 79 supra appears to assign two distinct bases for the standing restriction: 
the remoteness of the injury precludes the invocation of the powers of the federal 
equity court; and the "case or controversy" requirement of the federal constitution 
forbids consideration of a complaint where the injury is not direct. Neither of these 
two bases would bind the state court, although the first could be determinative if in-
voked as state law. See Doremus v. Board of Education, supra. On the other hand, if 
the state court were to view the standing requirement as attaching to the federal stat-
ute, the question could be resolved as a matter of federal law. 
(3) The trust-fund theory would render this action impossible. 
(4) Same as (3). 
(5) If this suit were initially instituted in the federal court, the disposition of the 
standing issue would probably depend upon a factual investigation of state fiscal ad-
ministration. If this investigation reveals that the injury was direct, as in Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the federal court could decide the case on the merits. 
If, on the other hand, the injury were deemed indirect, the cause would not be justi-
fiable. See Doremus v. :Board of Educ., supra at 434; McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 
U.S. 203,233 (1948) Qackson, J., concurring). Were this suit to reach the Supreme Court 
on appeal or certiorari as permutation (6), the above reasoning would appear to be 
equally applicable. 
(6) The suit would seem to be completely controlled by state standing requirements 
and therefore its disposition will be the same as that in permutation (8). 
(?) This suit is impossible to bring for lack of a federal question. 
(8) This suit would be governed in toto by state law and, because of the absence of 
a federal question, could not reach the federal courts. The majority of states appear to 
allow taxpayer suits which challenge the validity of state action under the state consti-
tution. See, e.g., Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941); Horace Mann League 
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fund theory is accepted by the courts, it is submitted that a finding of 
invalidity under the state constitution will, in effect, preclude all 
schoolchildren in the state from receiving Title I benefits. 
Assuming that the complainants allege a violation of the state 
constitution, consider the following three procedural settings in 
which such a suit could arise. First, the complainants may seek to 
enjoin state officials from participating in all Title I projects and 
returning the federal grants to the Office of Education.81 Since the 
trust-fund theory renders state law irrelevant in determining the 
permissible uses of federal funds, the state court would not have any 
basis for issuing a decree which would operate against the funds 
themselves. However, since the trust-fund theory will not immunize 
state officials from the restrictions of the state constitution, the courts 
can justifiably enjoin the state officials from participating in Title I 
programs. Thus, the result of such a suit would be to discontinue 
within the state the Title I program in its entirety. 
A second possible setting would be one in which the complain-
ants pray for an injunction against state officials participating in only 
those Title I projects which violate the state constitution. Since state 
restrictions are concerned only with aid to sectarian institutions, it 
might be expected that this would be the typical approach. Accord-
ingly, two of the complaints challenging Title I to date have asked 
only that state and federal officials be enjoined from extending 
certain types of aid to non-public schoolchildren;82 no attempt was 
made to restrict aid to public schoolchildren.83 The likely defense to 
these suits would be to invoke the trust-fund theory, which, if 
accepted, would lead to the same result as in the first example: the 
state officials involved in implementing Title I programs could not 
be forced to violate the assurances given pursuant to the ESEA, so 
that they would have to discontinue such programs in their entirety. 
A third possibility is presented if a state court were unwilling to 
entertain a defense based upon the trust-fund theory and sub-
sequently granted an injunction against the implementation of 
those, but only those, Title I projects that benefit non-public school-
children. Such schoolchildren might then sue in a federal court for 
of the United States v. Board of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966); Berghom v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 
260 S.W.2d 573 (1953); Conway v. New Hampshire Water Resources .Bd., 89 N.H. 346, 
199 Atl. 83 (1938); Herr v. Rudolph, 75 N.D. 91, 25 N.W.2d 916 (1947). But see Nichols 
v. Williams, 338 Mich. 617, 62 N.W.2d 103 (1954). 
81. This is the form of relief requested in Protestants and Other Americans United 
for the Separation of Church and State v. United States, Civil No. 3303 (S.D. Ohio, mo• 
tion to dismiss filed Aug. 16, 1966), a suit challenging the constitutionality of Title II 
of the ESEA under the first amendment. 
82. See Flast v. Gardner, Civil No. 4102/1966 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 1, 1966); Poller v. 
Board of Educ., Civil No. 19540/1966 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed Dec. 1, 1966). 
83. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1966, p. 28, col. 4 (city ed.). 
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a mandatory injunction requiring state officials to comply with the 
express terms of the ESEA. 84 Assuming that the federal court 
would accept the trust-fund theory, an order could be issued re-
quiring the state officials to comply with the assurances initially 
furnished to the Office of Education or to discontinue the entire 
Title I program. The state officials would thus be faced with both a 
state and a federal court injunction, and again the dilemma could be 
resolved only by discontinuing all state participation in Title I 
benefits. The officials might attempt to raise illegality under state 
law as a defense to the federal injunction. However, pursuant to 
classic trust law, the use of illegality as a defense to carrying out the 
terms of a trust results in a decree that the corpus of the trust be 
returned to the settlor under the theory of a resulting trust.85 There-
fore, in all three procedural settings, the finding of the invalidity of 
Title I programs under state law leads to the drastic result of de-
priving the state of any participation in the federal program. 
B. Effect on Administrative Practice 
The trust-fund theory could conceivably have an impact in two 
areas apart from the remedy question. If a state educational agency 
were aware of the probability that shared time or shared services 
projects would be deemed violative of the state constitution, it might 
attempt to avoid the possibility of having to discontinue all Title I 
programs by refusing to implement any potentially offensive proj-
ects. Such a decision would, of course, have to be executed discreetly 
so as to avoid any suggestion that the assurances given to the Office of 
Education were being violated. However, because such a tactic 
would probably result in a political uproar, the exclusion of non-
public schoolchildren from Title I benefits does not appear to be a 
feasible alternative. The agency might avoid this problem by de-
claring the potentially offensive project unsound as a matter of 
educational policy, and for that reason refuse to approve it. How-
ever, realistically, it is extremely unlikely that state educational offi-
cials would try to evade their responsibility in this manner.86 More-
84. The American Jewish Congress has suggested that the Roman Catholic Church 
will actively oppose any action brought to declare the ESEA unconstitutional in 
order to protect the parochial school interests. See American Jewish Congress, Back-
ground Memorandum on Church-School Lawsuits, Dec. I, 1966, p. 5. 
85. 4 ScoIT, TRUSTS § 442 (1956). 
86. According to the National Catholic Welfare Conference, all states except Okla-
homa, Missouri and Nebraska are implementing Title I at present. Letter From George 
E. Reed to the Michigan Law Review, Nov. 17, 1966. However, it appears that those 
three states have some type of Title I program. Oklahoma has established Title I pro-
grams in her public schools and permits parochial pupils to attend. Letter From Oliver 
Hodge, the Oklahoma Superintendent of Public Instruction, to the Michigan Law Re-
view, Sept. 21, 1966. Missouri appears to permit parochial school students to receive 
instruction after school hours. Letter From Delmar A. Cobble, Missouri Deputy Com-
missioner of Education, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 4, 1966. Missouri law allows 
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over, since the ESEA provisions call for an extensive evaluation of 
the state Title I programs by the Office of Education,87 such a proce-
dure could not be carried on without at least the tacit approval of 
the federal administrators, and the limited amount of available 
evidence suggests that the Office of Education favors maximum 
participation of non-public schoolchildren in Title I projects.BB In-
deed, the Office of Education appears to evaluate and recommend 
projects solely on the basis of their cost and the likelihood of their 
success, even where a particular project might appear to be more 
constitutionally objectionable than a possible substitute.89 
C. Effect on State Constitutional Law 
The possibility that a finding of invalidity of a particular Title I 
project will force a discontinuance of the entire state Title I pro-
gram may influence the state courts in their determination of the 
constitutional question. Although the precise nature of the question 
will obviously vary depending upon the particular project involved, 
and the almost complete lack of litigation in the area leaves much to 
speculation, several possible objections to Title I have been sug-
gested and should be considered. Since a shared services program 
not only provokes the same objections as shared time but also raises 
questions peculiar to itself, the following discussion will be focused 
primarily on such programs. 
The first suggestion of unconstitutionality, which applies to both 
shared time and shared services, is that the benefits of Title I flow 
primarily to the institution and not to the children involved. 90 The 
neither shared time during school hours nor shared services. See Special Dist. v. Wheeler, 
408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966). Nebraska apparently has implemented some projects includ-
ing parochial school students. Letter From Floyd A. Miller, Nebraska Commissioner of 
Education, to the Michigan Law Review, Sept. 21, 1966. 
87. E.S.E.A. § 206, 79 Stat. 31 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 241£ (Supp. 1965), as 
amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241£ (Supp. 1967). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE, GUIDEUNES: SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR EDUCATIONALLY DEPRIVED CHIL-
DREN 1, 34-40 (1965). 
88. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, 
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1966), reproduced in H.R. REP. No. 1814 (pt. 2), 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 11-23 (1966). 
89. One impressive example of this fact is the New Jersey Title I program which is 
based primarily on shared services rather than shared time. See Letter From Dr. William 
w·. Ramsay, ESEA Co-ordinator for the New Jersey Department of Education, to Mr. 
Joseph Hoffman, April 14, 1966 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). An Office of 
Education evaluation of the New Jersey program found that it was a model both in 
quality and quantity of approved projects. Ibid. 
90. The legislative history of the ESEA indicates that the child-benefit theory was 
intended to furnish the basis for combatting an objection under the establishment 
clause. See Kelley & Lanoue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Edu-
cation Act, in 1965 REUGION AND THE Punuc ORDER 110, 112-13 (1966). The theory's 
opponents counter by stating that the supposed distinction between aiding children 
and aiding institutions is fictitious. Ibid. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 216 
A.2d 668 (Del. 1966), for a discussion of these arguments. 
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resolution of this issue depends upon the state court's acceptance or 
rejection of the child-benefit or related theories.91 The drastic effect 
of a finding of state constitutional invalidity may compel a court 
which might otherwise not do so to accept one of these theories so as 
to avoid a finding of invalidity. 
A second objection, probably peculiar to the shared services pro-
grams, is that while the particular project may have an admittedly 
secular purpose, the means by which that purpose is effectuated are 
essentially religious in nature.92 The argument apparently posits that 
since a public means-the public school-is available through the 
use of shared time programs, the use of public teachers in the paro-
chial school building pursuant to a shared services program is an 
unnecessary religious means to the secular end of aiding all educa-
tionally deprived schoolchildren. However, the force of the religious-
means argument will depend upon two factors. First, since the means 
test originated as a corollary to the first amendment, there may be no 
basis in state law for applying such a test unless the state's constitu-
tion has been interpreted as conforming to the federal constitution.93 
Second, as a substantive matter, it might be argued that although 
the shared services method is in a sense more "religious" than shared 
time, policy considerations of convenience and cost militate in favor 
of the use of the former in certain cases.94 Since a tribunal faced with 
this question as a matter of first impression will thus have to weigh 
the various policy and political considerations, it is not unlikely 
that it will also take into account the fact that to find an individual 
type of project unconstitutional will deprive all of the schoolchildren 
in the state of Title I benefits.95 
Conclusion 
Although the possibility of non-participation in Title I may lead 
certain states to re-examine their substantive law, 96 it is nevertheless 
91. A significant split has developed over the child-benefit theory in the context of 
bus and textbook statutes. See ANTIEAu, CARROLL & Burum, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 23-50 (1965), for material indicating the position taken by various states. 
92. See Flast v. Gardner, Civil No. 4102/1966 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. I, 1966); Polier v. 
Board of Educ., Civil No. 19540/1966 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed Dec. I, 1966). Such an 
objection is apparently based on School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963), 
where the Court suggested that while a particular law might have a primarily secular 
effect, the use of religious means to implement the intended secular goal would violate 
the first amendment. 
93. See note 32 supra. 
94. This appears to be the primary reason for the extensive use of shared services 
projects in New Jersey. See Letter From Dr. William Ramsay to Mr. Joseph Hoffman, 
April 14, 1966 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
95. Apart from the two basic objections discussed above, the shared services concept 
appears to be vulnerable to the objection that public school teachers who are com-
pelled to perform their services in church-related schools are thereby denied the free 
exercise of their religion. See Complaint, 11 32, Polier v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 
19540/1966 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed Dec. 1, 1966). 
96. Although no widespread movement in this direction is expected, New York will 
have a constitutional convention commencing in the spring of 1967, one purpose of 
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likely that some courts will decide that Title I cannot legally be 
implemented in their states. To the extent that educationally de-
prived children are excluded from Title I benefits, the goals of the 
poverty program in general and the ESEA in particular will be 
frustrated. It is also conceivable that a considerable amount of 
political ill-will may be produced by the fact that children in some 
states are benefited by federal programs while those in others are 
not. If these problems are to be alleviated, the burden rests with the 
federal government. One possible solution is that, with respect to 
those states which cannot constitutionally participate, the adminis-
tration of Title I could be transferred from state to federal agencies, 
thereby completely nullifying the effect of state law.97 Indeed, such 
an approach has been used in at least one state to implement Title II 
of the ESEA.98 Unfortunately, however, the varieties of service 
projects constituting a Title I program renders it administratively 
unfeasible for the federal government to replace the state agencies. 
Thus, if, in a given state, Title I is rendered ineffective to any signifi-
cant degree, in the future its program might well be supplanted by a 
direct aid scheme which is more easily administered at the federal 
level, such as, for example, tax credits for non-public school tuition 
payments99 or direct grants to needy children or institutions.100 Such 
direct aid would promote the goal of better education for all while 
avoiding altogether the effects of state constitutional law. 
Jon Feikens 
which is to reconsider the state's "Blaine" provision with a view to replacing it with a 
provision similar to that in the federal Constitution. See Cusack, The New York State 
Constitutional Convention-A Preview, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL MEETING OF 
DIOCESAN ATTORNEYS 19 (1966). See generally Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the 
Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REv. 939 (1951); Rice, The New York State Constitution 
and Aid to Church-Related Schools, 12 CATHOLIC LAw. 272 (1966). 
97. See OP. S.D. ATT'Y GEN., March 10, 1966, p. 6. 
98. Because the Oklahoma Attorney General has ruled that Title II benefits may 
not be extended to non-public schoolchildren, Oklahoma has refused to implement a 
Title II program through its state agencies. Therefore, the Office of Education is ad-
ministering such aid through non-state agencies. Letter From Oliver Hodge, the Okla-
homa Superintendent of Public Instruction, to Michigan Law Review, Sept. 21, 1966. 
99. For a discussion of the so-called Ribicoff proposal, see Note, Church-State-Re-
ligious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey-1961-66, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 681, 
717 (1966). 
100. Direct grants to parochial schools are, however, extremely unlikely due to the 
obvious constitutional problems involved. For a discussion of this type of plan as well 
as of other programs of dubious validity, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE, MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
UPON FEDERAL Am TO EDUCATION, in s. Doc. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1961). The 
HEW memorandum and a reply memorandum prepared by the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference are reprinted in 50 GEO. L.J. 351 (1961). 
